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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
APRIL, 1930

VOLUME XV

NUMBER 3

SOME ASPECTS OF CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
W.

P.

M.

KENNEDY*

Students of American constitutional law are thoroughly familiar
with the various issues which have arisen over the taxing powers of
the federal and state governments, and principles have been established which are practically fundamental. Of these, one, for my
purposes, may be categorically stated: There exists a mutual respect
for the agencies or instrumentalities (in stricto sensu) of the national
and state governments, the idea behind this rule being that if the
taxing power were fully conceded to one government it might hurt,
cripple, or indeed defeat the activities of the other. The rule is thus
reciprocal. There is an "implied limitation" on the powers of the
various governments, "necessity" requiring this, lest the independence of any government within the union should be rendered
liable to hurt by the taxation or statutory regulation of any other. I
need hardly elaborate further this principle. It is sufficient for my
purpose, thus, in general terms, to refer to it, as some such reference
is a necessary introduction to our subject.
Within the British Empire are two federations-that of the Dominion of Canada and that of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The former was created in 1867, the latter in igoo--both by statutes
of the United Kingdom.' Within these two federations problems
have arisen analogous to those just referred to in the constitutional
law of the United States, and for many years there was a distinct
difference in judicial opinions in the solution of them. For Canada,
the interpretation differed until quite recently from that of Australia.
It would take us too far afield to enter into the causes which lay
behind these judicial differences. Certain facts, however, must be
pointed out. First, in the statutory constitution of neither federation
does there exist any explicit protection for the agencies, activities, or
instrumentalities (in stricto sensu) of either national, state, or provincial governments. The taxing powers of all governments are
*Professor of Law in the University of Toronto.
1.3o and 3i Vic. c. 3 (The British North America Act, 1867); 63 and 64 VIc. c.
12 (The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, i9oo).
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defined, and whatever the difficulties in law connected with these
definitions, we must at least note that they contain no such prohibitions, explicit or implicit, as have become rules in the United
States. It would seem, then, that the divergencies referred to need
not have arisen, as we should have expected that statutory interpretation would have been uniform, either-it does not matter for
the moment which expectation we might look for-as refusing to
recognize such prohibitions since none were laid down in the statutes
concerned, or as recognizing them as implied and necessary for the
protection of the federal principle'basic in the legal structure of each
nation.
We are thus led to a second point. The final interpretation of
the British North America Act lies with the judicial Committee
.of the Privy Council under a statute of the United Kingdom, which
Canada cannot alter or repeal.2 In Australia, however, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act made modifications, forbidding
any appeal to the judicial Committee "from a decision of the High
Court [of Australia1 upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the
limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and
those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court
shall certify that the question is one which ought to be determined by
[His] Majesty in Council." 3 On the other hand, the Act exempted
from statutory regulation by the Australian federal legislature the
control of appeals to the Judicial Committee from the Supreme
Courts of the States "in any matter in which at the establishment
of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court[s]
to the [King] in Council"!
It is obvious that a clash of interpretation was possible; and, as a
matter of fact, as we shall see, it became very grave. For example,
a case might go from a State court to the High Court and be decided
there finally, as the High Court might not consider it one for determination by the Judicial Committee. Another case of an exactly
similar nature might go on appeal direct from the Supreme Court of a
State to the Judicial Committee, which might hand down a decision
diametrically opposed to that of the High Court. This is, as will
appear later, exactly what happened. Fortunately or unfortunately,
there were clauses in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
2

The judicial Committee Act, 1844, protected by 28 and
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865).
363 and 64 VIC. c. 12, § 74 (1900).
4

1bid. § 73 (iii).

29

VIC. c. 63 (The
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Act which enabled Australia to settle the clashes in interpretation.That Act gave the legislature of Australia power to confer original
jurisdiction on the High Court of Australia "in any matter arising
under this Constitution", and to define "the extent to which the
jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that which
belongs to or is invested in the Courts of the States." Acting under
these clear legal powers the legislature of Australia in 1907 passed a
law excluding the Supreme Court of any State from deciding any
question as to "the limits of the constitutional powers inter se of the
Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limit
inter se of the constitutional powers of any two or more States",
whether on first instance or appeal. When any such point arises
for judicial decision in a State court, the case is ipso facto removed
to the High Court of Australia. 6 As a consequence, no appeal,
where any such issues are concerned, can reach the Judicial Committee direct from a State court.7 It may seem to the astute lawyer
that there remained the question as to whether the issue concerned
was in fact and in law one which came within the definitions of the
Act of 1907, and that the Judicial Committee might be called on to
settle such a point. It is true that such a power still remains; but the
Judicial Committee, in this connexion, has shown no desire whatever
to make fine and subtle distinctions, and efforts by the States along
these lines have been totally unsuccessful before the Judicial Committee. 8 Thus it has happened that the interpretation of the constitutional issues (among others the taxing power) has finally fallen in
Australia to the Australian High Court, whose interpretation has
differed, until quite recently, from that of the Judicial Committee in
interpreting analogous powers in the British North America Act.
With this introduction we can now consider some problems in
the constitutional law of these two nations. Obviously no article of
this nature could be anything like comprehensive. However, it is
possible to give American lawyers such a view as will illustrate
certain constitutional issues in the two other great federal legal
systems. In order to avoid confusion I shall treat each federation
separately, beginning with the Dominion of Canada.
5

Ibid. §§ 76 (i), 77 (ii).

WFederal Act, No. 8 (Australia, 1907).
7
Commonwealth v. The Limerick S.S. Co. Ltd., (1924) 35 C. L. R. 69.
Minister of Trading Concerns v. Amalgamated Society of Engineers, [1923]
A. C. 170; cf. Commonwealth v. The Limerick S. S. Co. Ltd., supra note 7;
Commonwealth v. Krelinger and Fernau, Ltd., (1926) 37 C. L. R. 393; (1902)
5 J. Soc. Com. LEG. (N. s.) 278.
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I.
(a) Interference by the Provinces with Canadianagencies, instrumentalities,or legal creations: One of the earliest cases resembles McCulloch
v. Maryland.' In 1882 the legislature of the Province of Quebec
imposed taxation on each and every bank doing business in that
Province, varying with its paid up capital and the number of its
branches, no allowance or exception being made even if the principal
place of such a bank's business were not in the Province, or if such a
bank were incorporated outside the Province. The Bank of Toronto
had its head office in Toronto in the Province of Ontario and was
legally incorporated outside Quebec, where, however, it had an agency
in the city of Montreal. The Bank of Toronto challenged the tax as
beyond the capacity of the Quebec legislature. Inter alia, it was
claimed by counsel for the Bank that there was a possibility that the
tax might become so discriminatory in its incidents as to defeat
the federal exclusive control over "banking and incorporation of
banks";10 and that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.'
The Judicial Committee, however, decided that the tax was fully
legal under the exclusive power of the Province to raise "direct
taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a revenue for
provincial purposes", 12 that it was not discriminatory, and that the
whole argument set up by deductions or otherwise from McCulloch v.
Maryland was not in accordance with British constitutional law.
The provincial legislatures were "sovereign within their ambit", 1
and to limit that ambit by ethical considerations, or by a theory of the
potential abuse of undoubtedly legal powers would be contrary
to the whole scheme of the British North America Act of 1867, whose
judicial interpretation must be guided by the decision of the question
whether or not the federal legislature or the provincial legislature has
power to legislate over the subject matter concerned. If a subject
matter is found to fall clearly within the powers of the Province, it
would be quite an invalid rule of interpretation "to deny its existence,
because by some possibility it may be abused, or may limit the range
which otherwise would be open to the Dominion Parliament."' 4 In
other words, the Judicial Committee refused to read any doctrine of
9

4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
103o and 31 VIC. c. 3, § 91 (15) (1867).
"Marshall, C. J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 9.
230 and 31 VIc. c. 3, § 92 (2) (1867).
3Laid down by the Judicial Committee in Hodge v. The Queen, 9 App. Cas.
117 (1883).
'Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575 (1887).
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"necessary prohibition" into the British North America Act of 1867,
and applied the well known principles of parliamentary sovereignty
to the provincial legislature, namely, that, given the legal power to
legislate, the manner of exercise of that power is beyond judicial
review.
Another taxing case, Abbott v. City of Saint John," will illustrate an
interesting point. A customs officer of the federal government
appealed against an assessment of his income imposed by the City
of Saint John, New Brunswick, acting under powers derived from the
legislature of that Province under its exclusive power over "municipal institutions in the Province."' 6 The Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the tax, following a decision of the Judicial Committee in a
similar case.'7 The tax was not discriminatory as it fell on every
person assessable under the classes of persons defined in regulations of
undoubted legal validity.
Two interesting company cases will serve to throw light on other
aspects of the taxing power. In 1915, there came before the Judicial
Committee the case of John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton. 8 The
appellant company was a federal incorporation under the federal
Companies Act. The Companies Act of the Province of British
Columbia laid it down that federal companies should be licensed or
registered under the provincial Act if they wished to carry on business
in British Columbia or to be parties to judicial proceedings in the
courts of the Province. The Judicial Committee held that the effects
of the Provincial Companies Act were such as to exclude from the
courts a federal incorporation unless it obtained a license from
the Province, and secondly that it differentially penalized such a
company and its agents if, without such a license, it or they attempted to carry on business in British Columbia, In other words,
the Companies Act of British Columbia struck at and nullified
capacities which were natural, logical, and consequential derivations
from the very incorporation itself of the company. In so far as the
legislation of British Columbia did this last, it was an illegal interference with capacities legally conferred on the company by valid
federal legislation, and to this extent it was ultravires of the Province.
In 1921 a somewhat analogous problem came before the Judicial
Committee in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King. 9 The appellant
company was likewise a federal incorporation with trading powers
15(19o8) 4o S. C. R. 597.
163o and 3i VIc. C. 3, § 92 (8) (1867).
17
Webb v. Outrim, [1907] A. C. 81.

"8[IgI]A. C. 33o.
19[1921] 2 A. C. 91.
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granted to do business inr any Province. Certain Provinces passed
acts to exclude such business, unless the company or companies in
question was or were licensed and registered under the said acts.
The licenses could not be withheld as in the case of the Companies
Act of British Columbia, and counsel for the Provinces argued that
the licenses were merely receipts showing that the company or
companies had complied with provincial legislative demands. The
Judicial Committee refused to accept the argument and held that
such legislation, in its generality, would render inoperative the
capacity or capacities of the company or companies derived from
undoubted federal authority. Certain sections of the provincial
acts were held intra vires; but, for our purpose, we need only note
that it is now clear that a Province cannot narrow the capacity of a
Dominion company, if that company is created to do business
throughout Canada under a federal law which is in itself a valid
exercise of federal legislative powers.
It will thus be seen that the general trend of judicial decisions is to
protect federally created capacities lest they should be handicapped
by discriminatory provincial laws. On the other hand, it would seem
that legislative action by the Provinces will be upheld if it is a clear
exercise of provincial powers applied indiscriminately; and in such a
case the courts will not consider the possibilities of abuse.
(b) Interferenceby the Dominion of Canadawith provincial agencies,
instrumentalities,or legal creations: In discussing this question I must
confine myself to a narrow field of illustration, and I shall omit, as
in the last section, the entire problem of insurance companies for the
simple reason that as to them the law is so highly confused that even
a separate monograph might fail to make it clear, especially to
foreign lawyers. The cases which follow are, however, of some
interest; and they will, in addition, as will appear later, afford points
of contrast with Australian decisions.
Section 125 of the British North America Act of 1867 lays down
the following principle: "No lands or property belonging to Canada
or any Province shall be liable to taxation." 2 Up to 1923 we had
arrived at a reasonable construction of that provision.21 In that
year, however, a new and interesting problem arose, which must be
kept in mind in the light of somewhat similar issues in Australia.
A cargo of whiskey was shipped for the use of certain public insti203o and 31 VIC. C.3, § 125 (1867).

21See, inter alia, Smith v. Council of the Rural Municipality of Vermillion,
[x916] 2 A. C. 569; Hudson's Bay Co. v. Bratt's Lake Rural Municipality, [I9191
A. C. ioo6; In re Town of Cochrane v. Cowan, (1921) 5o0. L. R. I69, 173.
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tutions in British Columbia, a Province then under exclusive "government liquor control", and the whiskey in question was imported by
the government of that Province. The federal customs officer
refused to release the whiskey for delivery until the federal duties
had been paid. The government of British Columbia relied on the
protection of the section of the British North America Act just
quoted, and claimed that, as the whiskey in question was undoubtedly the property of the Province, any tax on it would be illegal. The
Judicial Committee, however, decided that this section could not be
construed as an absolute prohibition, but must be read in the light
of the exclusive powers granted to the federal legislature over "the
regulation of trade and commerce" and over "the raising of money
by any mode or system of taxation." 22 They accordingly decided
that asessing the duty on the whiskey, even though it was the
property of the Province, was a perfectly valid exercise of federal
powers.n It may be that, in the light of this decision, we shall have
to abandon some of the rulings interpreting section 12 5 of the British
North America Act. Be that as it may, the decision of the Judicial
Committee is interesting in that it preserves the exclusive, enumerated
powers of the Dominion, which are granted "notwithstanding anything in the Act," 24 and also, because it affords an interesting illustration of arriving at a similar conclusion by different methods from
those used by the High Court of Australia-a point to which I shall
refer later.
The counterpart of Abbott v. The City of Saint John 24a is found in
Caron v. The King.5 The Minister of Agriculture in the cabinet
of the Province of Quebec claimed that his income as a provincial
officer should be free from federal income tax-a general system of
taxation imposed under the federal power to raise money "by any
mode or system" of taxation. The Judicial Committee applied the
principles of the Abbott case and laid it down that, while the federal
legislature might not so exercise its taxing powers as to destroy the
capacities of provincial officers, yet, in.the case in question, the tax
was not of the nature of such a discriminatory exercise of power
and was imposed on all persons within the classifications of the
federal income tax acts,2" without any regard to the sources of the incomes of such persons. For these reasons the provincial Minister
2230

2

and 31 VIc. c. 3, § 91 (2, 3), (1867).

3Att'y Gen. for British Columbia v. Att'y Gen. for Canada,

243o and 31 VIc. c. 3, § 91 (1867).
svaSupranote 15.
25 1924]

2

A. C. 999.

6Income Tax Act of 1917, and amending Act of

1919.

[r924]

A. C.

222.
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of Agriculture was legally taxed by Canada on his income as a provincial officer.
In concluding this division of our subject, we may point out that
there are rules of interpreting the British North America Act of
fairly general acceptance. The courts will treat it as an ordinary
British statute and will, accordingly, try to give to its every section
its natural meaning, reading it in the light of the rest of the statute
and without in the least allowing historical reasons, or reasons based
on any conception of the federal principle of government, to influence
them. Their duty, as they have conceived it to be, is to interpret.the
whole scheme of the Act without reading into it anything not necessarily implicit, to interpret a delicate and difficult distribution of
powers in such a way as not to nullify or destroy the federation. On
the whole, there has been success crowning these efforts, although
the Judicial Committee has been
within recent years the tendency2 of
7
to accentuate. provincial powers.
Ii.

The interpretation of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 9oo for many years followed quite different lines,
laid down in no uncertain terms by Sir Samuel Griffith, the first
chief justice of the Commonwealth, who imported into the canons
of construction entire principles and rules drawn from American
constitutional law. In addition, he went out of his way to emphasize
methods for interpreting the Act totally at variance from those
which have been relied on in construing the British North America
Act. For example, he said: "We think it right to emphasize what we
conceive to be a fundamental principle applicable to the construction
of instruments which purport to call into existence a new state with
independent powers of legislation and government... Such instruments are not and never have been drawn on the same lines as for
instance the Merchant Shipping Acts, which prescribe in every detail
the powers and authorities to be exercised by every person dealt with
by the statute.

28

Following this idea, a principle emerged that the intent of the
whole scheme of the Australian federation was the establishment of
2

See Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Alberta, [i916] i A. C. 588;

In re Board of Commerce Act of 1919, [1922] I A. C. 19I; Toronto Electric

Commissioners v. Snyder, [1925] A. C. 396; W. P. M. Kennedy, Law and Custom
in 28
the CanadianConstitution (Dec. 1929) RouND TABLE 143, ff.
Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxes, (1907) 4 C. L. R. io87. Griffith, C. J.,

cites in this connexion Story, J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304,
4 L. Ed. 97 (U. S.1816).
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separate quasi-sovereign governments, and that necessity demanded
that every power of each government must be construed as limited
and restricted so as not to hurt, injure, or impair the independence of
the other. This principle was applied to all control, whether of a
taxing or regulative nature, by any one government in Australia
over the operations of any other. It is obvious that behind these
rules lie contractual conceptions as between the parties to the federal
union. Indeed in 19o6 Griffith, C. J., elaborated this canon of
interpretation. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
is, he said, not merely an Act of the legislature of the United Kingdom; it is a compact entered into between the six Australian colonies
which formed the Commonwealth. "The rules, therefore," he added,
"that in construing the statute regard must be had to the existing
laws which are modified by it, and that in construing a contract
regard must be had to the facts and circumstances existing at the
date of the contract are applicable in a special degree to the construction of such a constitution."2 9 As a consequence, the High
Court of Australia purported to give effect to a rule laid down by
Bowen, L. J., in The Moorcock
"[T]he implication which the law
draws from what must obviously have been the intention of the
parties, the law draws with the object of giving efficacy to the transaction." Indeed, Griffith, C. J., expressly declared that his rules of
construction were drawn from the principle enunciated in The Moorcock. 31

To follow in detail the case law governed by these principles and
canons would in truth almost amount to a treatise on Australian
constitutional law. My purpose will be served if I trace the law in
Australia connected with the doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities, showing its early history and its establishment. The
matter will be of special interest to American lawyers in disclosing
the influence of American constitutional law in Australia; while the
final abandonment of the doctrine will be of value to legal students,
who study with care comparative jurisprudence.
The doctrine first came up in Australian constitutional law in
what is known as Wollaston's Case.3 2 This was a case stated by the
Commissioner of Taxes for the State of Victoria as to whether one
29Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Ass'n
v. New South Wales Railway and Traffic Employees Ass'n, (19o6) 4 C. L. R.
488, 534.
3°I4 P. D. 64, 68 (1889),
31
1n Att'y Gen. for Queensland v. Att'y Gen. for the Commonwealth, (i915)
20 C. L. R. 148, 162-3.
32(19O2) 28 V. L. R. 357.
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Wollaston, a federal officer, should be assessed for State income tax
in Victoria, where he resided and carried out most of his federal duties.
The Supreme Court of Victoria rejected the principles laid down in
McCulloch v. Maryland, refused to accept any pleas based on a
"doctrine of necessity", and followed the lines of the rulings already
discussed in analogous Canadian cases. Two years later, D'Emden v.
Pedder,n the first important constitutional case with which the High
Court of Australia dealt, was connected with the same point. The
question at issue was whether a State could compel a federal officer to
use a State stamp on a receipt for his salary. The High Court explained, amplified, and established the doctrine of the immunity of
instrumentalities. Griffith, C. J., in deciding in favor of the federal
officer against Tasmania, the State in question, said: "It must... be
taken to be of the essence of the Constitution that the Commonwealth is entitled within the ambit of its authority, to exercise its
legislative and executive functions in absolute freedom, and without
any interference or control whatever except that prescribed by the
Constitution itself... It follows that when a State attempts to give
to its legislative or executive authority an operation which, if valid,
would fetter, control, or interfere with, the free exercise of the
legislative or executive power of the Commonwealth, the attempt,
unless expressly authorized by the Constitution, is to that extent
'
The rule was applied two years later to
invalid and inoperative. 'aaa
state instruments in the strictest sense,u and thus the doctrine was
made reciprocal.
Matters did not rest here. When in Deakin v. Webb35 a problem
almost similar to that in Wollaston's Case came on appeal before the
High Court of Australia, that court reversed the unanimous decision
of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and applied the principle laid
down in D'Emden v. Pedder, supporting their decision with the
United States Supreme Court case of Dobbins v. Commissioners of
Erie County.36 They also laid it down that the question of the liability of a federal officer's salary to State taxation came within the
question as to the limits, inter se, of the constitutional powers of
the Commonwealth and those of the States, within the meaning
of the Constitution, that therefore the decision of the High Court
33(I904) i C. L. R. 92.
33albid., per Griffith, C. J., at log-i1.
34

Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Ass'n
v. New South Wales Traffic Employees Ass'n, supra note 29.
35(19O4) I C. L. R. 585. See Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia
905) 18 HARV. L. REV. 559.
3616 Pet. 435, IOL. Ed. 1022 (U. S. 1842).
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was final, unless that Court should certify the case as one for the
determination of the Judicial Committee, which certificate the Court
7
refused.
The States, however, were not to be outdone. Outtrim, a federal
officer in Victoria, objected to the assessment of his federal salary
by the income tax law of that State. The Commissioner of Taxes
referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Victoria, which, feeling
itself bound to follow Deakin v. Webb, decided against him. 38 The
Commissioner, however, obtained leave to appeal directly to the Judicial Committee under the provisions of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act,3 9 and the case came before that body
4
under the title, Webb v. Outtrim.
The government of the Commonwealth obtained leave to intervene and was represented by counsel.
The Judicial Committee refused to follow Deakin v. Webb and reversed the judgment of the Court of Victoria. There was thus a
pretty situation. The Judicial Committee held one doctrine, and the
High Court of Australia held another. A way out of the difficulty
was found. The Commonwealth, first of all, allowed the States, by
federal legislation, to tax the salaries of federal officers;41 and, in
order to settle the conflict in law, the federal legislature in 1907
passed the Judiciary Act, under which, as we have already seen,
the Supreme Court of any State was excluded from dealing with
cases of this nature, which, when they arose, were automatically
removed to the High Court of Australia. This settled matters for
thirteen years, and constitutional lawyers believed that the doctrine
of the reciprocal immunity of instrumentalities was an integral part of
Australian constitutional law. Dis alitervisum.
In 192o, a case of vast importance arose before the High Court.4
The respondents were carrying on trade under legislation of Western
Australia, and their operations were likely to give rise to "industrial
disputes" within the meaning of the Commonwealth of Australia
Act if the respondents had been private individuals. They were,
however, operating steamships on behalf of the government of
Western Australia. The question was whether such a governmental
activity was immune from federal legislation in relation to "inVIc. c. 12, § 74 (1900).
Outtrim's Case, [19o5] V. L. R. 463.
3963 and 64 Vic. c. I2, § 74 (iii) (I900).
3763 and 64
38

"°Supranote 17.
Comnonwealth Salaries Act, 1907.
4Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide S. S. Co. Ltd.,
C. L. R. I29.
4163 and 64 Vic. c. 12, § SI (xxxv) (19oo).
41

(1920)

28
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dustrial disputes", a subject matter on which the federal legislature
had legally legislated. The result of the case, which was against the
State, is immaterial; but it is interesting to note that the issues
could have been decided quite apart from any reference to the doctrine
of the immunity of instrumentalities, since that doctrine had not
been held to apply, either in Australia or in the United States, to the
trading activities of a government, but only to governmental agencies
in stricto sensu.44
The High Court, however, reviewed the doctrine and laid down a
rule now known as "the rule in the Engineers Case": The Constitution of Australia is to be interpreted and given effect to according
to its own terms, finding the intention from the words, and upholding
the Constitution precisely as framed. It is to speak with its own
voice, "clear of any qualifications which the people of the Commonwealth, or, at their request, the Imperial Parliament, have not
thought fit to express, and clear of any questions of expediency or
political exigency. 45 As a result, the High Court rejected the
doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities based upon the principle of necessity or implied prohibition. In other words, that court
has now come into line with the Judicial Committee. The Australian
Constitution is therefore to be interpreted quite apart from the contractual ideas of Griffith, C. J., and in accordance with the well
known rules of statutory construction; and in conformity with the
views which govern in the Dominion of Canada.
In so far as federal agencies are to be immune from State taxation
or regulation, this immunity will in the future be governed, not by the
doctrine of necessity, but by the fact that they are created in relation
to subject matters belonging in law to the federal legislature, and
protected by the rule of the Constitution: "When a law of a State is
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth the latter shall prevail,
and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.' '46
Under this position it is clear that anything like the American doctrine
of the immunity of instrumentalities is gone; and that such protection as exists is based explicitly on the Constitution, which gives,
47
however, nothing like a reciprocity of "immunity" for the States.
"Cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (Ig9i); Federated Engineers Ass'n v. Broken Still Proprietary Co., (i911) 12 C. L. R. 398; Australian
Workers Union v. Adelaide Milling Co., (1919) 26 C.L. R. 460.
45Engineers Case, supranote 42, at 142.
-.
46Cf. ibid. i i i; and see 63 and 64 Vic. c. 12, § 109 (1900).
47Cf. Commonwealth v. State of Queensland, (1920) 29 C. L. R. I; Davoren v.
Commonwealth Commissioner of Taxation, (1923) 29 Argus L. R. 129. See

CANADIAN & AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 357
I may note, before leaving this case, that it laid down some rules as to
the use in Australia of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. They cannot in the future be recognized as standards
whereby to measure the respective rights of the Commonwealth and
4
the States; but they can be used for guidance in cases of ambiguity.
Before concluding, I wish to refer to one other type of Australian
case for purposes of comparison with Canadian constitutional law.
We have seen how the difficulties were solved in Canada in relation to
federal taxation of provincial property, when it in reality was provincial property for purposes of trade. In Canadian law, the lines
followed were that provincial governmental trading must not be
allowed to interfere with the legal taxing powers of the federation;
and that is true in spite of the guarantee of protection already quoted
from the British North America Act. In Australia similar situations
have arisen, and the High Court has arrived at similar conclusions;
but, in spite of a rule of the Constitution that "the Commonwealth
shall not impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a
State", 49 and in spite of clear federal taxing powers, the process of
reasoning has differed from that in Canada. For example, a government cannot import, free from federal duties, steel rails required for
a State's railways; much less can it import, free from federal duties,
wire-netting for general use in the State. 0 The High Court did not
consider the federal taxing power and balance it, as in Canadian
law, against the section just quoted from the Constitution Act.
They preferred to say that the taxes were importation taxes and not
taxes on property. The year of these decisions is 19o8. Would such a
fine point be made today in the light of the Engineers Case?
Sir R. Garren, The Development of the Australian Constitution (1924) 40 L.

Q.
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Engineers Case, supra note 42, at 146.
12, § 114 (19oo).
40Att'y Gen. of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs, (19o8) 5 C. L. R.
818; The King v. Sutton, (19o8) 5 C. L. R. 789.
4963 and 64 VIc. c.

